Acquiescence

Acquiescence

Submission to an act of which one had knowledge. Pence v. Langdon, 99 U.S. 578, 25 L.Ed. 420 (1879);

Silence is considered an admission of guilt in civil matters Admissions by silence 32 AmJur 2d 253;

"Acquiescence" relates to inaction during performance of an act. See: In re Wilbur's Estate, 334 Pa. 45, 5 A.2d 325, 331.

Effect of Failure to Deny. Cercone v. Cercone, 254 Pa.Super 381,386 A.2d 1(1978).

"Acquiescence" is synonymous with "abandonment". Sclawr v. City of St. Paul, 132 Minn. 238,156 N.W.283, 284.

"A shocking crime was committed on the unscrupulous initiative of few individuals, with the blessing of more, and amid the passive acquiescence of all." Publius Tacitus

Estoppel

Estoppel is the principle which precludes a person from asserting something contrary to what is implied by a previous action or statement of that person or by a previous pertinent judicial determination. Government agencies are not be entitled to less stringent estoppel criteria. Lovell Mfg. v. Export-Import Bank of United States, 777 F.2d 894, 901 (3d Cir. 1985)).

Under the law of estoppel, "silence" implies knowledge and an opportunity to act upon it. Pence v. Langdon, 99 U.S. 578, 581, 25 L.Ed. 420. (1878)

Estoppel is applied against wrongdoers and not against victims. Appalachian Inc. v. Olson, 468 So.2d 266, 269 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).

Acquiescence in acts of an agent, or one who has assumed that character, equivalent to an ex­press authority.

2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1309; Kent, Com. 478; Story on Eq. S 255; 4 W.C.C.R. 559; 6 Mass. R. 193; 1 John. Cas. 110; 2 John. Cas. 424; Liv. on Ag. 45; Paley on Ag. by Lloyd, 41; 3 Pet. R. 69, 81; 12 John. R. 300; 3 Cowen's R. 281; 3 Pick. R. 495, 505.

"Estoppel by Conduct - An estoppel exists where a man by his own acts or acceptance is concluded from saying the truth." Menzenberger v. American State Bank, 101 Ind.App. 600, 198 N.E. 819. See, also, Equitable Estoppel. Blacks law 4th pg 367

The Court cannot go behind them, revise them, disregard them, or set them aside. Where parties consent, even though their own silence, then they bind the Court; where they do not, or cannot consent, the Court binds them.

Conventio vincit legem. See: Benigne facienda sunt interpretationes chartarum, ut res tnagis valeat quam pcreat.

Articles in this website

The Governments of God and other gods

"In Roman law, “patria potestas” must be viewed as an imperium, and not as a right of property like the power of a master over his slave.

"The Constitution is often an icon of popularity in the minds of the people today, but the covetous souls of mankind have formed a government by the action and inaction of an indulgent population, by covetous participation and application, by slothful acceptance and acquiescence for more than two hundred years." Fiction of law

"History has been the judge but few today have heard the debate, nor do they understand the precepts of human nature or the construction of government through contracts that pump blood into the veins of tyrants. It is the greed and avarice of the people that give breath to the corporate state. When the people breath out the sigh of sloth and acquiescence, despots take a deep breath and act upon their vacuum of virtue." Not a party

"Incorporation is often accomplished by a social contract created through the execution of oaths, applications, or acquiescence, if not acceptance. Under such conditions the people give up a share of their freedom and grant an exercising authority to others." One Body

“Nothing strengthens authority so much as silence.” ― Leonardo da Vinci

“If I were to remain silent, I'd be guilty of complicity.” ― Albert Einstein Slip_Hazard#Acquiescence

Ongoing explanation of Article 2 Section 22 can be read at Article_2_Section_22

Consensus

Consensus facit legem - Consent makes law

“Conventio vincit legem” - “Where parties consent, they bind the Court; where they do not consent, the Court binds them”

“Nemo ex suo delicto meeiorem suam conditionem facere potest” – “No one can improve his condition by his own misdeed”.

A court of equity will never lend its active aid to a party who, by artful silence, has gained an unfair advantage over another; nor will the court condone credulity. Equity will refuse its aid where the complainant has been guilty of any unconscionable conduct. Eaton Equity Jurisprudence (1901) Eq. 74.

The Court requires an adverse party to interpose his objection in due season; and if he fail so to do, he will be deemed to have waived his right to object. The neglect to do a thing in proper season is called laches, and is one of the unpardonable sins in the sight of a Court of Equity. Gibson, “Treatise on Suits in Chancery” (1907), sec. 68, pg.62.

Acquiescence is where a person who knows that he is entitled to impeach a transaction or enforce a right neglects to do so for such a length of time that, under the circumstances of the case, the other party may fairly infer that he has waived or abandoned his right. Scott v. Jackson, 89 Cal. 258, 26 Pac. 898; Lowncles v. Wicks, 69 Conn. 15, 36 Atl. 1072 ; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Perdue, 40 W. Va. 442, 21 S. B. 755 ; Pence v. Langdon, 99 U. S. 578, 25 L. Ed. 420.

Acquiescence and laches are cognate but not equivalent terms. The former is a submission to, or resting satisfied with, an existing state of things, while laches implies a neglect to do that which the party ought to do for his own benefit or protection. Hence laches may be evidence of acquiescence. Laches imports a merely passive assent, while acquiescence implies active assent. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 Pac. 678; Kenyon v. National Life Ass'n, 39 App. Div. 276. 57 N. Y. Supp. GO; Johnson-Brinkman Commission Co. v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 126 Mo. 345, 28 S. W. 870, 26 L. R. A. 840, 47 Am. St. Rep. 675. Blacks 2nd Edition, page 20.

We therefore held that engrafting a requirement that "a qui tam plaintiff . . . have played some part in his allegation's original public disclosure," id. at 1418, was in accord with Congress's purpose "of encouraging private individuals who are aware of fraud being perpetuated against the Government to bring such information forward," id. at 1419 (internal quotations omitted)), because it "`discourages persons with relevant information from remaining silent and encourages them to report such information at the earliest possible time,'" id. (quoting United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 1990)).

Seaboard Air Line Railway Co. v. D. A. Dorsey, (1932) FL.40867, 149 So. 759 (1932) – “he who is silent when conscience requires him to speak shall be debarred from speaking when conscience requires him to be silent”

"A practice condemned by the Constitution cannot be saved by historical acceptance and present convenience." U.S. v. Woodley, 726 F.2d 1328 (1983)